Despite a new government, Syria’s turmoil has the same old and bitter taste. The militant group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), under its hardline Sunni rule, toppled Bashar Al-Assad’s government four months ago. Since then, new waves of violence have swept across the country, specifically targeting its minorities. Widespread unrest in Latakia resulted in over 1,000 Alawites casualties. The Alawites are make up ten percent of Syria’s population. Interestingly, here is no evidence that HTS ordered the massacres which raises questions about the transitional governments’ failures to  prevent mass executions and to bring other militant groups under its control. This is important due to HTS’s commitment to show tolerance to minorities, which was a principle that leader Ahmed Hussein Al-Sharaa had firmly expressed himself. With broken promises of plurality, more instability is likely.

 

Undoubtedly, a tempestuous future for non-Sunni minorities in Syria is looming, particularly because of HTS’s jihadist roots. In a not-too-distant past, the group were often subjecting Druze, Armenian, Christian and Shia Islamist communities in Idlib, northwest Syria, to torture, ill-treatment, and death sentences. This background and the Latakia’s executions make it tough to believe in HTS’s newfound commitment.

 

So far, Syria is fragmented into several zones of control, which are usually influenced by external forces. For instance, Israel has made significant inroads in the Druze minorities’areas in the south. In the north, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are in opposition, with a United States (US) contingent present to protect oil resources. Along the coast, Russian military bases are located. All of these zones have been shaped by the heavy influences of a turmoiled past. The Damascus Spring in the early 2000s was intended for reform discussions, but became a tool to repress the Regime’s opponents; Islamist extremist insurgencies rose and gained traction amongst discontented public factions; in 2011, the Arab Spring served to further inspire government opposition and kick-started the Syrian Civil War. From there, the conflict in the country became even more multi-faceted, drawing in regional and international actors – Iran and Hezbollah’s support for the Syrian government prompted responses from Israel, Turkey and the Gulf states, and all the while ISIS took advantage of the instability in Syria to seize territory, whilst Kurdish groups intervened. To say the situation in Syria is complex is a sweeping understatement, and to ignore the depth of how this complexity is likely to evolve is a grave mistake.

 

The toppling of Assad – bringing an end to a decades long family dynasty – has brought a host of complex challenges to Syria’s allies and neighbors, potentially fueling sectarian tensions and creating new avenues for instability in the region. Iran left part of its influence in the Levant, as Syria has long served as a vital ally and a crucial route for Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With Iran’s ability to support Shia groups diminished, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states can become even more assertive, intensifying the power struggle for regional dominance. Furthermore, Turkey’s role in Syria would likely expand significantly, mainly if it played a key part in ousting Assad, potentially leading to friction with other regional players and a reshaping of the conflict’s dynamics.

 

The change in power could trigger additional complex changes in the region. The overthrown of Al-Assad, a member of the Alawite minority, could be seen as a win for Sunni Muslims, deepening existing sectarian divisions across the Middle East. Furthermore, a power vacuum in Syria risks creating an opening for militant groups like ISIS to regain ground and destabilize surrounding countries. A fragmented and chaotic Syria could easily spill over into Iraq, amplifying sectarian tensions and fueling assailants, posing a widespread threat to regional stability.